During an oral argument on Monday, November 2, several Supreme Court
justices seemed to be wary of having courts determine the fees that investment
funds can charge participants.
Depending on how the court rules, the case could involve courts in
compensation decisions, setting the stage for the legal system gaining influence
on executive remuneration. The case revolves around shareholders of Oakmark
Mutual Funds suing Harris Associates, the fund sponsor, for charging excessive
fees.
Harris is also the advisor to the mutual fund and appoints the Oakmark board
of trustees. The board approved the fees, which were double the amount assessed
institutional investors who were independent of Harris.
The Oakmark shareholders argued that Harris violated the Investment Company
Act of 1940 with its fee schedule. A northern Illinois district court ruled
against the plaintiffs. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the verdict,
arguing that absent an effort to mislead the trustees, the market should set
fees.
But 7th Circuit Judge Richard Posner issued a strong dissent, writing that
the idea that the market knows best is “ripe for reexamination.”
That’s exactly what the Supreme Court began to do during the November 2 oral
argument.
“The one thing I’m sensing is a reluctance to have the court too intricately
involved in setting fees,” said James Gregory, a partner at Proskauer Rose in
New York who studied the argument transcript.
Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. was skeptical about the court’s ability to
discern fee levels. For instance, what if a fund beats the market by 5 percent
over five years?
“Does [the advisor] get double the normal compensation of the average fees?”
Roberts asked. “Does he get triple? Fifty percent more? How is the court
supposed to decide that?”
Justice Sonia Sotomayor also questioned how the court could determine whether
a fund charges appropriate “arm’s-length” fees.
“Using the word ‘fair fee’ in my mind is meaningless, because it has to be
fair in relationship to something,” Sotomayor said. “What’s the proof that a
particular transaction is not arm’s length?”
David Frederick, the lawyer for Jeffrey Jones and the other shareholders,
said that the problem lies in the fact that Harris bought the same stocks and
performed the same duties for Oakmark and institutional funds but levied higher
fees on the former.
The Oakmark shareholders cannot leave Harris because the Oakmark fund is
“captive.”
“The director can’t fire and walk away from the advisor,” Frederick said. “In
any arm’s-length transaction, if I sell you a car and you don’t like the price,
you can walk away. Fair [is] what the advisor actually charged for same or
similar services to an outsider who had the right to walk away.”
Justice Anthony Kennedy explored the meaning of the word “fiduciary” in the
Investment Company Act and whether it can be applied more broadly.
“If I look at a standard that the fees must be reasonable and I compare that
with what a fiduciary would do, I thought fiduciary has the highest possible
duty,” Kennedy said. “But apparently the submission is the fiduciary has a lower
duty, a lesser duty than to charge a reasonable fee. I don’t know why Congress
didn’t use some other word.”
Justice Stephen Breyer attempted to define “reasonable” fee in such a way
that judges are not on the hook for making the determination.
“The substance is to look and see if it’s reasonable, and if it’s reasonable,
it certainly is the product of arm’s-length bargaining. If it’s not reasonable,
how could it be?” Breyer asked. “So, that way, you see, the tone is ‘Be
careful—you are a judge, you are not a rate-setter.’ ”
The
exchanges regarding fiduciary duty and rate determination have broader
implications because they show the court wrestling with how much sway it should
have in regulating markets, according to Gregory.
“They’re looking at whether their opinion will have an effect on compensation
at public companies,” Gregory said.
John Donovan Jr., the Harris attorney, argued that the market is the best
arbiter of fees.
“These were funds that had best-in-class performance for fees that were at or
below industry averages,” Donovan said. “That is not a record upon which a
reasonable person could conclude that the advisor has overreached. That is at
the heart of fiduciary duty.”
The case is Jones v. Harris Associates, docket number 08-586.
—Mark Schoeff Jr.
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